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Human Rights and Animal Rights: Differences Matter 
Tine Stein ∗ 
Abstract: »Menschenrechte und Tierrechte: auf die Unterschiede kommt es an«. 
This critique of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s important book, Zoopolis, 
asks in what respect humans and animals categorically differ and to what ex-
tent this difference counts in a moral sense. Second, the text explains why it is 
illegitimate to equate human victims of racial discrimination and murder with 
tormented and killed animals. Finally, it is demonstrated why the conceptual 
analogies to animals presented in this book, namely ‘co-citizens’ as a term for 
animals that live in companionship with humans, ‘denizens’ for those animals 
that cross borders between human and natural living spaces, and ‘sovereign na-
tions’ for wild animals, have to be interpreted as overstretched analogies. The 
main thesis is that the promise of the book – to develop a political theory of 
animals’ rights – remains unfulfilled. 
Keywords: Zoopolis, citizenship, human-animal relations, animal rights, human 
rights. 
1.  Zoopolis and the Restructuring of Human-Animal 
Relations 
Zoopolis is a large-scale outline of a political theory based on human-animal 
relations (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). The authors’ intention in developing 
discussions on animal ethics and rights, which usually stagnate in moral-
philosophical statements on a political level needs to be acknowledged. Don-
aldson and Kymlicka aim to restructure human-animal relations fundamentally 
and apply their conclusions, derived from insights in moral philosophy, to the 
political sphere. In particular, the authors aim to show how changing the politi-
cal status of animals can change human behaviour towards them; such behav-
iour ought to comply not only with negative (omission) duties but also with 
positive (performance) duties. They group animals into three categories based 
on their relations to humans: (1) domesticated animals which live together with 
humans, (2) wild animals which live in their natural habitats (often limited by 
expanding human civilisation) and finally (3) liminal animals, which immigrat-
ed into human living spaces and live as commuters between the wilderness and 
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human dwellings. Donaldson and Kymlicka assign political concepts to these 
three groups: domesticated animals are associated with the concept of citizen-
ship, meaning that the animals should be considered as co-citizens; wild ani-
mals are connected with the concept of sovereignty and are to be understood as 
independent communities outside human units, commanding respect for their 
territorial integrity; and finally liminal animals are linked to the concept of 
denizens, who as migrants should be able to profit from basic rights without 
being citizens and, therefore, carrying the associated rights and duties. Apply-
ing these political concepts to animals leads the authors to make claims regard-
ing the arrangement of human-animal relations that can also be found in the 
“traditional” animal rights movement. For instance, they demand that commer-
cial use of animals is renounced, and in general replace the idea of a utilisation 
of animals by the notion of bilateral cooperation. Moreover, the authors’ de-
mands regarding the freedom of animals, especially freedom of reproduction 
and freedom of movement, as well as their demands for a consideration of wild 
animals in their habitats when building human living space and infrastructure, 
are well-known in the traditional literature on animal rights. 
With reference to the numerous specific suggestions relating to the organisa-
tion of human-animal-relations, such as the ban on cruel and unethical inten-
sive livestock farming for meat, egg and milk production, the authors will 
receive wide approval. Furthermore, the demand for the preservation and de-
fence of animal habitats against human interests, which has always been a core 
element of the conservation movement, will convince many readers. The au-
thors could even have demanded more extensive changes in human behaviour 
which threatens animals, since the modern industrial way of life and its conse-
quences for natural resources have put wildlife areas at risk. The changes in the 
habitats of polar bears due to climate warming constitute a famous and telegen-
ic example. Indeed, thousands of animals are struggling to adapt to changing 
natural surroundings, which more often than not means that they will face 
reduced living spaces and thus decreased opportunities to find adequate food. 
Moreover, for decades zoologists have reported on a singularly serious historic 
extinction process of species. These aspects are – surprisingly enough – hardly 
considered in Zoopolis. However, the main critique that I will present in the 
remainder of this contribution will not address missing reflections for those 
demands which do find wide approval anyway. My main point is about those 
other demands that seem to preach to the converted and will convince people 
who already believe, with the authors, in the fundamental equality between 
humans and animals and, therefore, accept the transfer of political concepts to 
human-animal-relations. The author of this comment does not agree with the 
premise of equality, considers it implausible and, consequently, cannot approve 
the resulting demands.  
In the following, I will first present some reasons that speak against award-
ing equal moral status to humans and sentient animals. By ‘equal moral status’ 
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I refer to the assumption outlined in Zoopolis that there is no categorical differ-
ence between sentient living beings which can bear the burdens of proof of a 
different moral status (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 24-32). Moral status in 
general refers to a quality that is defined in one’s having universal rights (not 
necessarily moral duties). This controversial topic has often been the subject of 
discussion, for some to the point of indifference, but will nevertheless still need 
to be addressed here. As a result, the analogy between the oppression, killing 
and exploitation of humans and the suffering of animals is to be viewed criti-
cally. The transfer of political concepts to human-animal-relations, especially 
to wild animals, is to be rejected. A political theory of human-animal relations 
should consider further aspects.  
2.  Contesting the Presumption of Equality between 
Humans and Animals 
Animals have an intrinsic value as sentient beings. Thus, as humans, we have 
duties towards animals, even extensive duties, which not only involve omis-
sions, such as preventing suffering through intensive livestock farming, but 
may also include positive duties in terms of providing services for animals. For 
example, humans have to protect animals’ living spaces and their developmen-
tal capacities. However, animals do not have the same moral status as humans. 
What is the difference? Let us first summarise the similarities between humans 
and animals. As ethological animal research has shown (confirming what many 
non-scholars experience with animals in their households), animals are social 
creatures which communicate, are capable of showing empathy and on this 
basis cooperate socially, even with other species. They are capable of behaving 
altruistically and sometimes also appear to have a kind of self-awareness. Nev-
ertheless, a categorical difference from humans exists: animals are not capable 
of adopting an “eccentric position.” By this formulation, the philosophical 
anthropologist Helmuth Plessner means that humans are characterised by, 
among other aspects, awareness of their centre as distinct from their environ-
ment and that they can refer to this middle of the self in a reflexive manner 
(Plessner 1985 [1928]). Animals do not have the ability to “see themselves 
from the outside” as the German philosopher Robert Spaemann, drawing on 
Plessner, has put it (Spaemann 2001, 471).1 On this basis, they cannot relativise 
their own interests and set general rules which fulfil the criteria of moral gener-
alisability. This leads to an argument put forward by the American philosopher 
Christine Korsgaard. With recourse to Kant, she states that humans have a 
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normative self-image which makes it possible to question one’s own behaviour 
and to judge whether one’s actions are justified or not (Korsgaard 2014, 263 et 
seq.). This capacity for normative self-determination, i.e. the ability to behave 
autonomously, is the core element of being a moral creature, in other words, a 
person, and – as far as we know – animals do not have this ability. 
It is essential to highlight two aspects of this controversial, sometimes even 
polemical, debate. (1) If one insists on this categorical difference, it does not, at 
the same time, indicate that animals do not have intrinsic moral value. Addition-
ally, it does not lead to denying animals’ individuality. Animals are individuals 
too; they have interests – to live, to reproduce, to eat, to move, to play, to cooper-
ate – but they cannot be considered as persons in terms of the philosophically and 
historically developed meaning of this concept. We do have duties to animals as 
sentient beings, but not because they are persons as humans are. (2) A second 
aspect concerns the objection from what is sometimes called the non-paradigm 
argument. According to this argument, an important question should be posed. 
Given that we consider the capability to act along the lines of normative self-
determination as the embodiment of the unique human dignity in the personali-
ty of humans: Does this entail that individuals who have not yet shown this 
capability, such as toddlers, or cannot exhibit this behaviour any longer, such 
as dementia patients, or cannot display this capability at all, as in the case of 
some handicapped people, cannot be regarded as persons? If this were the case, 
it would mean that these individuals would be humans without human dignity 
status. However, according to Korsgaard as well as Spaemann there is a differ-
ence between those who belong to a particular species that is defined by per-
sonhood in the above mentioned sense and those who belong to a different 
species. In the case of the various species of non-human animals, their inability 
to develop a normative self-image is not a divergence or defect, as it would be 
for a young, sick or handicapped human being, but follows from their nature. 
To sum up, it can be argued that being human and being a person fall into 
one and the same category through their joint affiliation with the same genus. 
This view cannot be criticised to constitute an instance of ‘speciesism.’ This 
objection is based on the assumption that there is in fact no relevant difference 
between humans and animals which can justify a differential treatment. Ac-
cording to the critics of speciesism, emphasising a specific feature of human 
beings in order to explain their priority over animals cannot be anything but a 
purely ideological argument and thus has to be seen on the same level as the 
arguments of those who believe differences in human ‘races’ to justify slavery. 
However, stressing the categorical difference between humans and animals 
does not inevitably lead to the assumption that animals do not need moral con-
sideration and thus does not justify their unethical treatment. Moreover, this 
objection opens itself up to critique, because those who deny the categorical 
difference between humans and animals and who instead draw a line at the 
criterion of sentience cannot help but categorise themselves. In terms of hu-
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man-animal-relations’ composition, the significance of being a person is great-
er, because it shows us the responsibility we have as humans for animals. 
3.  Illegitimate Comparisons 
The different moral status of humans and animals entails that there is a differ-
ence between the killing and exploitation of humans and animals. In order to 
avoid misunderstandings here, it needs to be stressed that this does not mean 
that the killing and exploiting of animals is generally legitimate. Rather, ani-
mals have to be treated in a just way, more specifically, a species-appropriate 
way. However, if one group of people intends to kill and exterminate another 
group of people, and for this purpose discredits them as subhuman or nonhu-
man beings, as was the case during the Holocaust, their criminal behaviour is 
of a different order than that of causing animals harm and pain, or of confining 
them permanently in tiny cages until they are finally killed. Whereas the Nazis 
murdered other human beings for the most abhorrent reasons one can imagine, 
namely to extinguish a specific group of people of equal human status, the 
killing of animals for the production of food is not led by hatred and the will to 
extinguish equal members of humankind. Thus, cruel as these battery hen units 
are, they should not be described as manifestations of an “eternal Treblinka”; 
this comparison is not just polemical but illegitimate. Moreover, the equation 
of the mass murders of the Holocaust with battery hen units is apt to trivialise 
the unparalleled/singular event of the Holocaust.  
The comparison of animals exploited for the production of food or for medi-
cal purposes and enslaved Africans is illegitimate in the same way, and the 
same holds for the comparison of the victims of ethnical cleansing with the 
displacement of rats from human domiciles. Furthermore, following the case of 
a campaign by the animal rights organisation PETA a couple of years ago, if 
photos of Holocaust victims and photos of battery hen units are placed side by 
side,2 the degradation of the people pictured in concentration camps is exploit-
ed for the purposes of animal protection. Although in a lesser way, the same 
holds true for all similar kinds of comparisons, not only for visual representa-
tions, where the remembrance of human victims serves to illustrate animal 
suffering. In all such cases, the equation of human and animal suffering is 
highly problematic.  
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HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  60 
4.  Overstretched Analogies 
The most important critique from a perspective of political theory addresses the 
conceptual analogies that were chosen in order to substantiate this frame of just 
human-animal relations theoretically. To categorise the animal kingdom in 
three groups is very enlightening. However, the correlation of the three politi-
cal concepts of citizenship, denizenship and sovereign nationhood with these 
groups fails to convince. First, it is not clear at all whether this attribution of 
political terms is meant metaphorically and implemented for heuristic reasons 
in order to shed light on the possibility of human-animal relations based on 
equality, or if this attribution is intended as a genuine ascription (rats like refu-
gees or rats as refugees). The plausibility of this conceptual transfer without 
further explanation makes sense only for those who go along with the assump-
tion of an equal moral status for humans and animals. For all those who do not, 
the conceptual transfer remains a metaphor, which can at best lay open some 
similarities between the relations among humans and the relations between 
humans and animals. However, the original justification of this transfer cannot 
be readily deciphered.3 To give an example: the statement that wild animals 
build a “community” raises the question of whether or not “community” is used 
here in the sense of thick relations, or if alternatively the reference is to a socie-
ty whose members are, in comparison, loosely connected. What is meant here 
with regard to the classical sociological differentiation between the terms 
“community” and “society,” as well as in many other cases where social theory 
has created specific definitions for its concepts? 
This question needs to be asked more specifically with regard to the concept 
of “political community,” a type of communality which, according to the au-
thors, is to be formed between humans and domesticated animals. The authors’ 
use of the term “politics” has to be scrutinised carefully. Does “politics” here 
refer to fulfilling the interests of those who live within a state, and to the pro-
cess of how conflicting claims about the respective interests are to be resolved? 
In the tradition of normative political theory, such a notion of politics can ap-
pear very restrictive. For modern conceptions of normative political theory, 
politics is the process of citizens acting together by means of communication, 
governing themselves on an equal footing and setting up rules for public af-
fairs. However, the authors do not see a problem in the fact that animals by 
themselves are incapable of being independent actors in the political communi-
ty of discourse and consequently need to rely on collaborators who translate 
and represent their interests. In their view, this is also sometimes the case with 
some handicapped people who are also dependent on support in order to claim 
their interests. Nevertheless, this is not a convincing line of argument with 
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regard to the aforementioned characteristic of personhood that belongs not only 
to some humans, but to all humans, and thus to handicapped people as well.  
As argued above, personhood embodies the capability of normative self-
determination, which, in a specific sense, is relevant in the political sphere too. 
When we come together in the political community in order to assign ourselves 
rules that aim to fulfil the criteria of a just arrangement in public affairs, then 
we do this presuming that primarily we do not all have our own interests and 
our particular good (welfare) in mind, but that we all argue for laws that uphold 
the criteria of generalisability – in other words: laws that are fair and regulate 
public affairs as defined by the public good. This is at least the claim from the 
perspective of normative democratic theory. We cannot demand the realisation 
of this normative standard from animals because they do not have the capacity 
to act according to normative self-determination that is associated here with the 
political sphere. Consequently, this cannot be demanded from their trustees 
either and we cannot, therefore, build a political community with animals. A 
political community can be composed only of equal members based on person-
hood. This does not mean that all members necessarily have the same rights all 
the time. For instance, children do not have all the rights of adult citizens. 
Further, even if we grant ‘rights’ to animals, these rights do not represent the 
rights of equal members of the political community. Animal rights are of a 
different character – they reflect the duties we have as persons towards sentient 
beings but do not correspond with membership in a political community. With 
the inclusion of animals, the normative standard of democracy would become 
bizarre. This holds true even if animals would not be entitled to vote. The pic-
ture that is painted in Zoopolis, illustrating the political representation of ani-
mals, remains vague (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 153 et seq.). 
A further problem that goes along with this ambiguous transfer of concepts 
is that concepts may lose their distinctive character. That we can shed light on 
the relations between humans and animals with the help of social theory termi-
nology should in general terms not be questioned here. Evidently, different 
kinds of communities exist between humans and animals, even communities 
with social interactions as is the case with human-animal companionship. And 
as already stressed, in such social relations we owe duties to animals, e.g., fair 
treatment. However, these kinds of community relations cannot be considered 
as political. We do have to acknowledge animals’ interests in our political 
decision-making-process. But we owe such duties to animals not because they 
are equal members of a political community, as shown above, but for several 
other reasons, e.g., because they are sentient living beings, they might be part-
ners in a social coexistence, and the like. In sum, the political analogies used by 
Donaldson and Kymlicka, especially of those operating with notions of citizen-
ship, seem overstretched and, therefore, unhelpful. 
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5.  Conclusion  
In conclusion, Zoopolis presents a plausible outline of human-animal relations 
only to those who are already convinced that humans and animals do not differ 
in a morally relevant way. In light of this fact, the question has to be raised 
about whether the human community would not be overburdened by the re-
sponsibility for a political community of humans and animals – not only politi-
cally but also economically and culturally. How could the motivational energy 
and the moral resources for this new form of solidarity which humans owe 
animal citizens in the eyes of the authors be nourished – in societies within 
which solidarity for “fellow human citizens” must already be repeatedly reac-
tivated, not to mention solidarity for citizens of the world, as demanded in 
recent theories of cosmopolitanism? Thus, Zoopolis can be characterised as a 
utopia with all the promises and burdens that go along with such a political 
outline. Its promises can be seen to lie in the fundamental challenges the book 
presents to commonplace experiences, here: the cruel way in which we treat 
animals. However, the burden of utopian thinking is that it may lead to exces-
sive demands and thus to the permanent de-legitimation of a political reality 
that can never reach its ideal. 
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